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TYPOLOGY AND WORD MEANING

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Preface

In this book I continue the elucidation of main tasks within linguistic typology. I would like to emphasize that the inner connections between different language levels shown by the typology are essential for the structural description of languages. It follows that the questions arising in a language must always be answered with regard to the entire language structure. In some comparative language approaches, there is a very pronounced tendency to reduce the language differences to only quantitative differences. The investigation of the dominant principles of language structure, which have an integrating effect on the entire language structure, is a contribution of classical typology to linguistics, the consideration and non-consideration of which is of fundamental importance.

§1. Linguistic Activity

Linguistic activity consists in characterizing real or hypothetical situations, in describing or judging them. Each such situation is so complicated that it does not seem possible to fully represent it in terms of language. It turns out that speakers of different languages, faced with exactly the same situation, may not necessarily consider the same elements as essential. In order to say, for example, that a certain person is professionally involved in teaching (i.e. that *he is a teacher*), a Kwakiutl speaker must include in his/her statement whether he/she can see that person when talking about him/her or not, the user of the Polish language must specify the gender of this person and a user of, for example, English or Hungarian does not need to know it. If the person is, for example, of Chinese nationality and his name is Huang, then in Hungarian you can say:

Huang tanar.

This sentence is translatable exactly into English:

Huang is a teacher,

but into Polish it is not clear what gender Huang is. Moreover, a Hungarian can describe such a situation without mentioning the surname Huang, changing the surname into a personal pronoun

Ö tanar,

and the sentence will be grammatically correct and completely truthful. However, an Englishman will not do it without information about the gender of a person named "Huang" – he/she has to choose a pronoun "he" or "she". In Kwakiutl, one must also know whether Mrs. Huang is in sight or out of sight of the speaker.

Similarly, it is difficult to convey the idea expressed in the Polish verb "to go" in Navaho, because in Navaho there are separate lexical elements (roots) to describe the activities of movement by one person, by two people, by several people, by a large group of people, but there are no one that would generalize it, meaning the act of walking without taking into account the number of people.

Detailed linguistics provides thousands of such examples. It can be assumed that a certain, but quite limited, number of meanings is shared by the experience of all people, all peoples, speakers of all languages, regardless of belonging to one or drastically different cultural circle, place of living or living conditions; this experience is determined by the physical properties of the surrounding world. This does not mean, however, that the experience has to be linguistically organized in the same way.

Speakers of different languages choose different elements when describing the world. For example, in order to articulate an utterance, a Chinese speaker who uses *putonghua* has 405 syllables-morphemes at his disposal, each of which can occur in one of the four tones, and in the Polish language there are only 8 vowel phonemes and 33 consonant phonemes.

The main types of languages differ according to how the expression of grammatical categories and relations between the word and the sentence is

distributed. The flective languages are languages where the grammatical categorization is primarily understood as word categorization, or where the word categorization has a fundamental grammatical relevance. The isolating languages are languages where sentence structure is primary. The agglutinating languages occupy an intermediate position with regard to the word-structuring and sentence-structuring principle. The grammatical formants are here closely attached to the fully semantic word, but they retain their formal identity, and their functions are syntactically determined by sentence structure, not semantically determined by word categorization, as is the case in the flective languages.

This becomes particularly clear when comparing the semantics of IE cases with the function of agglutinating so-called case suffixes, i.e. of the suffixes signalling the basic nominal relations. The IE accusative is by no means restricted to the syntactic function of the direct object, nor to the relational nominal role of the patient. Its semantics is given by distinctive features within the paradigmatic oppositions; accusative expresses direct and total affection, versus dative with indirect and genitive with partial affection.

Analytical and incorporating forms of expression can also be observed in the old IE languages, which, however, reverse the flective character of the confirm language. The analytical pronominal and prepositional elements specify the functions of the grammatical forms, whose basic categorical validity and semantics are already given by flective means of expression. The phenomena which occur in several types of language show in them qualitatively very different character. One can see from the example of congruence how externally the same phenomenon in language structures has to be described. In the IE structure, congruence is related to the principle of the autonomy of the word in the non-compact, non-formalized sentence. As it is well known, it was Mr Meillet who emphasized this principle, which is fundamental to the relationship between word and sentence.

Mr Meillet documented it especially in ancient Greek, Mr Havránek then further developed Meillet's ideas in the ancient Slavic languages. In this structure, each word is marked independently for the grammatical features that are relevant to its semantic-syntactic validity. The congruence within the noun phrase is particularly important for the comparison with other language types. Not only the noun but also the adjective is marked for the noun categories of case, number and gender. As Mr Hjelmslev has pointed out, the IE congruence is to be seen as an independent reflection of the same content-semantic categories in the noun and adjective. The syntactical effect of congruence, namely that the noun and adjective belong together as components of a syntagma, is secondary. The syntactic effect of congruence in the IE structure is by no means connected with a solidified and formalized character of the noun phrase. On the contrary, here the congruence enables an independent, distant position of the adjective, which represents one of the expressions of the non-compact, loose sentence structure.

This is different from languages with a fixed and formally hierarchized noun phrase where the dependency of the adjective is revealed by or the congruence of

another type occurs. In languages with a fixed, formalized sentence structure, congruence is a formal syntactical means that expresses the idea that noun and adjective belong together. The following Latin and Swahili noun phrases, with the Latin examples being a translation of the Swahili examples, illustrate this difference well:

(1) Congruence in Swahili:

m-tu m-zuri	*m-* class of people
homo pulcher	
ki-su ki-kali	*ki-* class of instruments, etc.
*culter acuteu*s	

In Latin, the noun and adjective have a form according to the declension to which they independently belong. The gender feature is only formally expressed in the adjective, in the noun it is only implied. Conversely, in Swahili class features are primarily signalled in the noun and then repeated in the same form in the adjective. So in the case of the adjective pronounced, the formal characteristics are repeated, which are primarily signalled in the case of the noun. The noun phrase is formalized in Swahili by fixed word order, and the repetition of the class feature is another expression of the syntactic dependence of the adjective on the noun. Similarly, the repeated expression of the same categories within a syntagma in the Balkan languages is an example of congruence serving to solidify the syntagma. The repetition of the definite and gender characteristics in the noun phrase, for which the examples are given under 2, is again connected in the Balkan languages with the contact position of the noun and adjective (whereby in Albanian and Romanian the prefix of the noun is irregular, while in Bulgarian the prefix of the adjective is regular):

(2) Congruence in the Balkan languages:

Greek *ο αλός ο φίλος / ο φίλος ο καλός*
Bulg. *dobriyat priyatel*
Rum. *prietenul cel*
Alb. *miku i mirë*

In the Balkan languages, congruence as a formal repetition of the same feature in the area of a syntagma is realized in a typical way by combining flexive and analytical, especially anaphoric means, and it also occurs in other constructions, namely in the object repetition in the syntagma “verbum-object” and in the repetition of the personal characteristic in the construction of Greek type *θέλω να γράφω* “I want to write”, where the finite verbal form is used instead of the infinitive. In the noun phrases, the congruence/repetition is expressed by doubling the article and by the gender declension, whereby gender declension means the fact that the declension types also in the noun after the genders are distributed and the gender characteristics

of the adjective are clearly expressed. Congruence/repetition as a formal syntactic device is in the Balkan languages a way in which the the further development of the IE sentence formalization is realized, as we mention further in connection with the evolutionary perspective.

While the IE congruence has a semantic character as an independent expression of the same categories in each fully semantic word and is the expression of the autonomy of the word in the sentence, in the agglutinating Bantu languages it serves to consolidate the noun phrase. The repetition of the feature in the adjective, which only has semantic referential validity in the noun, is a formal-syntactical means here. Similarly, in the Balkans, congruence is a syntactic means of formalizing and consolidating the syntagma. Using the example of congruence, Mrs Kurzova has tried to show how something that is externally similar and can be understood with one and the same term has a very different character, depending on the structural hierarchy and the inner connections in which it appears in the individual types of language structure.

The comparison of the IE structure with the Bantu structure on the one hand and the Balkan structure on the other leads us at the same time to the question of the evolutionary perspective, in which the typification of languages according to the flective, agglutinating, etc. principle appears to make sense. As is known, there have always been attempts in typology to bring the identified main types of language structure into a certain sequence, whereby the thesis prevailed that for the prehistoric development of the flective languages the order of *isolation-agglutination-inflection* applies as a general development perspective. According to this, the IE structure in the prehistoric development should also have undergone the change from the isolating to the agglutinating and finally to the historically attested flective structure.

However, the reconstructed data offer no support for the assumption of the structure where the grammatical categories and relations are denoted syntactically by word order or other means of expression characteristic of the historically attested isolating or incorporating languages. The reconstructed data can be understood within the framework of the older type or stage of inflection, which can be called “derivative-flective”, taking into account the fact that the lexical classes or categories of nouns and verbs have their own morphological and morphosyntactic characteristics, and thus the morphology shows a derivative character, which is close to the lexical derivation. In general, the main types of language structure are particularly pronounced in the oldest representatives of the individual language families, and can be viewed much more as alternative possibilities of primary typing.

The language-historical problem that was solved by these different types was the structuring of a sentence consisting of several lexemes. For the flective type, word structuring was primary from the start, each word was formally structured for its semantic-syntactic validity in the sentence. Conversely, in the isolating structure, multiple lexeme-containing units were formally structured as a whole by introducing the lexemes into a specific linear sequence or by linking them together by specific segments. Here, the sentence structure was primary and the lexical categorization of

the words resulted inversely from their structural position in the sentence. So, in our view, the different main types are related to the transition from the presupposed stage with single-lexemic word-sentences to the complicated multilexeme sentences. This assumed primitive stage cannot be identified with any of the attested language structures, not even with that of the isolating languages, which already represent a certain way of structuring the multilexeme statements.

If we determine the principle of grammatical relevance of the derivative-flective word categorization as the dominant and central typological principle of the IE flective structure, we see that the formation of all levels of language is thereby internally predetermined. At the morphonological level, it is the expression of grammatical categories and features through internal modification of the word, combining internal and external inflection.

(3) Congruence of the IE case forms:

VS + -s	NS + -E*s*	Nom.Sg. dónt-*s*	Gen.Sg. d$_o$nt-ós
VS + -m	NS + -E*m*	Acc.Sg. dónt-m	Gen.Pl. d$_o$nt-óm
VS + -i	NS + -E*i*	Loc.Sg. matér-*i*	Dat.Sg. matr-éi

VS = full level, NS = zero level, E = vowel

Another essential feature of this morphology is the cumulative-fusional expression of grammatical features, where a formal modification designates several semantic features, as we see again in the noun endings, where case, number and in certain cases also gender are expressed by a noun ending. This is an expression of the basic morphological principle, where grammatical information does not emerge through the addition of a particular segment, but emerges from the paradigmatic oppositions of word forms. These morphonological and formal morphological phenomena are intrinsically related to the distribution and type of grammatical semantics.

And just the fact that the language type is not only formally, but semantically motivated and determined, testifies to the primary character of the typological differences, testifies to the fact that the main types arose from a fundamentally different design process and cannot be transferred to one another. The application of the flective formants was bound to a particular lexical class, and its semantics were themselves semantics of the category-inherent (immanent) type. The different morphology of the nominal classes of animata and inanimata is also directly attested in the historical structure by the identity of the nominative and accusative in neuter and by the special plural of neuter. Both were semantically motivated in the original structure: the subject as a privileged participant was restricted to the animata only, the plural had a special collectivity meaning. In the verbal area, the classes of active and inactive verbs can be reconstructed, which have a different series of personal endings:

IE Aorist		*Gr. Perfect*	*Heth. Medium*
a-gā-m	-a<-h_2e	oíδ-α	eš-ha-hari
a-gā-h<-s	-tha<-th_2e	oíσ-ϑα	eš-ta-ri
a-gā-t	- e/-o	oíδ-ε	eš-a-(ri)

In the further development, both verb classes were integrated and the morphological oppositions of the integrated verbal system were formed, where the original inactive endings appear in a transformed form as perfect tense and medio-passive endings. The fact that the morphological semantics were inherent in the word category, not relational, is readily apparent from the case semantics already mentioned. The case semantics is expressed in the paradigmatic oppositions, it is in no way defined by relational semantic roles of agent, patient, beneficiary, etc., or by syntactic relations of subject, object, etc. And this is at the same time an expression of the word autonomy, the autonomy of the nominal constituents in relation to the verb.

The categorial/immanent (inherent) type of semantics is particularly well preserved in Ancient Greek, and emerges through comparison with Latin, where relational semantics are already more developed. The tendency to subordinate a certain kisus to a certain syntactic relation is very pronounced in Latin, the accusative is, unlike in Greek, the case of the direct object, the genitive is freed from the ablative function and represents a predominantly adnominal case. In the realm of the verb the semantic orientation of Greek morphology and the syntactic orientation of Latin morphology are particularly evident in the presence of aspect in Greek versus the Latin system of relative tenses. In terms of the expected typological consistency, Greek also provides good evidence of the features of the original derivative-flective structure on the semantic-syntactic level, namely the autonomy of the words or the sentence constituents and the loose, non-compact sentence structure. In Latin, the sentence structure is far more formalized in terms of obligatory positions and formalized order.

§2. Phonological Typology

Due to the number of segments making up the phonological systems of individual languages, these languages can be classified into three types:

I. languages with a poor phonological system,

II. languages with a moderately rich phonological system,

III. languages with a rich phonological system.

The range of 12-20 phonemes was assumed as the boundaries of the poor system. The poorest systems are found in Polynesian and Austronesian languages. The universal feature of phonological systems is at least three-element triangular-shaped vowel system offered by Mr Helwig in 1781.

i u

e o

a

The triangle differs according to the language type.



Arabic



Latin



Italian

However, detailed studies of the world's languages have shown that: (1) there are linear systems, (2) there are languages with less than three vowel phonemes. Depending on the percentage of vowels and the ratio of the so-called primary to secondary elements in the phonological systems of individual languages, the languages were divided into those of consonant and vowel.

Due to the nature of the accent category, there are languages with a dynamic accent and languages with a tonic accent. The dynamic stress consists in distinguishing certain well-defined syllables in a word and in the text by pronouncing them with greater force. Here we can distinguish languages with a dynamic permanent accent and languages with a dynamic moving accent. Languages may have a constant stress on the beginning syllable of a word (e.g. Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Finnish, Mongolian), on the root syllable (i.e. with numerous unstressed prefixes, e.g. in Germanic languages), on the last syllable (e.g. French, Armenian, Khmer, largely Uzbek and other Turkish languages), on the penultimate syllable (e.g. Polish, to a large extent Italian, slightly less Spanish), on the third syllable from the end of a word (Macedonian).

Some languages enforce the accent stability very strictly (e.g. French, Czech, Hungarian), in others there is a certain amount of borrowed lexis with the preserved accent of the source-language different from the recipient language and / or a certain amount of lexis with a constant accent, but located differently (it can be the same lexis or different) - this is the case, for example, in Polish with words stressed on the third syllable from the end, e.g. *matematyka.* There are languages in which constant dynamic accent is implemented in a slightly different way. In the highly polysynthetic Chukchi language, the last syllable of the matrix is always stressed when it is followed by suffixes, and the multiplicity of suffixes does not invalidate this principle; however, if the word occurs without any suffixes or with a non-syllable suffix, then the emphasis is on the penultimate syllable. In complex forms with incorporated further matrices, the last syllable receives a side button in each of these matrices. A dynamic secondary accent, weaker than the main one, occurs in long words in practically every language with an accent of this type.

§3. Morphological Typology

Language has a set of meanings and a set of means of expressing meanings. Meanings can be either lexical or grammatical. Lexical meanings are references to their non-linguistic equivalents (they are simply names of elements of the surrounding world); examples of lexical meanings can be: “yesterday”, “me”, “table”, “write”, “Japan”, “law”, “lawless”, “behind”, “under”, etc. Examples of grammatical meanings may be: “Past Tense”, “first person”, “singular”, “countability”, “causativity”, “accusativity”, “ergativity”, “passive voice” etc. All grammatical meanings can be classified into grammatical dimensions, which are finite, non-empty sets of such meanings. Examples of grammatical dimensions include time, person, gender, case, aspect, class, etc.

All grammatical meanings belonging to the same grammatical dimension are treated as homogeneous. So, for example, “nominative”, “genitive”, “dative”, “accusative”, or “masculine”, “feminine”, “neuter gender” are appropriately homogeneous in Polish and belong to grammatical dimensions. but not all languages possess the same categories. For example, you can classify languages according to the grammatical category of number - into languages that have such a category and into languages that do not have such a category. Among the former, we can distinguish the languages with only two subcategories (e.g. only singular and plural, such as Polish, English, Italian), with three subcategories (e.g. singular, dual and plural, such as e.g. Slovenian or most Eskimo languages), etc.

Each grammatical category in a given language has its own formal categorical exponent, or set of such exponents. Formal categorical exponents can be position of a word in relation to other words, auxiliary words, intonation, reduplication, affixation, prefix, infiltration, suffix, tone changes, accent.

One of the best known and oldest classification of world languages due to their morphological structures (the so-called classification according to the degree of compactness of groups or syntactic members) is the classification that divides languages into four types: isolated, agglutinative, inflectional, incorporated. The dominant or the only types of categorical exponents in the morphological isolating type are the position of the invariant word carrying lexical information in relation to other invariant words, and loose morphemes, or rather auxiliary words (because they are often bimorphemic or even polymorphic). This type includes, first of all, the so-called “monosyllabic” languages of the Southeast Asian (such as Chinese, Thai, Vietnamese, Khmer, Tibetan, etc.).

The dominant type of categorical exponents in morphological agglutinative and inflectional types are affixes (prefixes, suffixes, infixes, confixes; the prefix is an element preceding the root of a word, the suffix is an element attached after the root, the infix is an affix that is incorporated into the root, while the confix is a set of affixes that function within it). The basic difference between these two types is the property of accumulation of more than one grammatical meaning in one affix.

The lexical function of words in the so-called the alternative type is to be related

to their consonantal structure, and grammatical meanings are to be implied by the vowels alternating in this consonant structure. The Semitic languages, in particular Arabic, Hebrew and Syriac, were considered to be the most “typical” for this type of language. Meanwhile, even a cursory analysis of the grammatical systems (paradigms) of alternative-type languages shows that it is not necessarily as if it results from the definition.

§4. Semantic Typology

Semantic typology is used to classify languages according to the similarities and differences between their lexical systems. This typology is important for the geographical classification of languages and is widely used in ethnolinguistic, ethnological and ethnographic research.

In these studies, it is often pointed out that in individual languages there is an extensive vocabulary relating to a specific area of activity typical for a given community or habitat of a given community, linking this phenomenon with the overwhelming influence of these areas or the environment on the development of the language of this community: “various kinds of snow in Eskimo” or different names for “camel” in Arabic.

These opinions are often greatly exaggerated, and only partially coincide with the linguistic facts. Semantic typology often overlaps with morphological typology, using the fact that the surrounding reality is classified differently, which is also reflected in the morphological systems of languages - this is what explains the fact that in a language we deal with a large number of words with the meaning “great” or “small”, etc., used depending on what they are meant to determine.

In principle, every categorical meaning can be considered from the point of view of originally semantics and thus can constitute another basis for the typological classification of languages: so, for example, you can analyze and classify languages according to grammatical meanings of time, persons, numbers, etc., without the analysis of categorical exponents.

Many languages are mixed types in such typology, but not neutral; for example, Eskimo languages are both ergative and nominative. As it is not difficult to conclude from this short presentation, this typology is still in its initial phase, there are still too many theoretical ambiguities in it, and above all too little detailed data on the multiplicity of individual languages, the linguist has at its disposal to use such a classification. So far, the most useful and used in various disciplines of anthropological sciences are linguistic semantic typologies related to the terminology of kinship, colour names, with indication (systems of personal pronouns and demonstrations), with ordering (numeral systems).

§5. Syntactic Typology

In syntactic typology, the most important thing is the division of languages with regard to the degree of constancy of the order of syntactic members - parts of a sentence. In synthetic languages, the order of syntactic members may change without substantially changing the meaning of the entire sentence or the entire utterance.

Moreover, in languages with a very strictly defined order of syntactic members, e.g. in languages of the isolating type rearranging the pattern is also possible (especially in everyday speech); for example, in Chinese, where the position of a given element is practically the only exponent of its syntactic function, the exact SVO array may be violated or changed, provided, however, that an appropriate formal exponent is introduced (in the example below *ba*) informing about such a violation of the pattern: *tā nannies zheben shū* (SVO) – *tā ba zheben shū nianle* "he read this book".

The languages of the SVO type are English, Chinese, Polish, French, German, Igbo, Javanese, etc. SOV languages are Japanese, Korean, Chukchi, Ainu, Ossetian, Tamil, Tibetan. VSO languages are Semitic languages like Arabic, Hebrew, Celtic (Scottish, Irish, Welsh), Polynesian (Samoan, Maori). VOS languages are Malagasy, Fijian.

Extremely interesting and original is Milewski's typology, which is based on differences in the functions of syntactic means:

1. subject-verb sentences (S – V)
2. agent-verb sentences (A – V)
3. patients-verb sentences (P – V)
4. determinans-determinatum sentences (Ds - Dt).

According to its creator, the distribution of three exponents (symbolized below by *a, b, c* as the order, affix, and incorporation) allows to classify the world's languages into six syntactic types with the following exponential structures:

Table 1

Syntactic Order/ Type	**I**	**II**	**III**	**IV**	**V**	**VI**
S-V	a	a	a	a	a	a
A-V	a	b	a	b	a	b
P-V	b	a	b	a	b	a
D_s - D_t	c	c	b	b	a	a

Types I include languages with three different formal indicators to express theses relations; they are are mostly IE, Semito-Hamitic, Uralo-Altaic, Chino-Tibetian languages. Agens in the Type II is formally equal to the subject; most Caucasian, Paleo-Asiatic languages are represented there. In Type III Patians substitutes the subject. Mr Milewski pointed to the rarity of types V and VI, and as examples he called Hopi, Eskimo, Salish, Mayan languages, some Caucasian, the

Tsimshian dialect from the Nass River, Tunica, and Guarani.

The above classification is related to the already signalled problem of the indistinctness in some languages between a nominal phrase and a sentence, and the problem of the so-called ergative construction (corresponding more or less to type II of Milewski's classification) usually opposed to a nominative construction (roughly to type I of this classification). In fact, the concept of an ergative construction in linguistics is used to describe a whole range of constructions that differ from a nominative structure.

§6. Dialectical Nuances

According to Mr Berezin, while we are speaking about dialects, we must be clear about the so-called *social dialects.* The most striking example of a social dialect may be found in the Yana language (an American Indian language). Differences in the use of Yana correspond to the sex of the speaker and person addressed:

Table 2

	Men's language	**Women's language**
fire	*'autia*	*'auh*
my fire	*'autüja*	*'a u 'nich*
deer	*batia*	*ba'*
grizzly bear	*t'en'na*	*t'etl*

Mr Sapir states some important differences as follows:

(1) With the noun, *-na* is used after vocalic stems only in male speech, but dropped in the female. After consonant stems, *-na* is retained in female speech too.

(2) In male speech the interrogative is marked by *-n*, and in female by lengthening (doubling) a simple vowel.

(3) The male form is *-naa,* the female, *-gaa,* for interrogative sentences requiring a negative answer.

(4) In female speech, the final syllable of a phrase ending in a single vowel is unvoiced, but voiced in male speech.

Mr Berezin also notes that the Yana language includes a number of expressions specially used by women (or children); and alongside with these expressions it has special grammatical forms and peculiarities in pronunciation. These special "women's languages" may be found in many parts of the world, and certain deviations in the pronunciation of women from that of men can be found in civilized societies.

§7. Word Meaning

The study of meaning is complicated by the fact that there are a lot of words

with more than one meaning. When a man perceives the world surrounding him/her he/she uses the same word to denote various features of the thing for which the word is used. If there is a need to name a thing or phenomenon in our material environment in any way connected with an object already designated by a word, the word is used in another meaning. This process of words acquiring new meanings led to polysemy (Greek *polys* "many", and *sema* "sign"). The meaning of the word *house,* for example, absorbs the meanings of such words as *hut, cottage, palace, bungalow,* etc. These meanings cluster together, partly overlapping, partly defining each other.

In the process of the semantic development from one primary meaning, many new meanings may appear, in successive and progressive derivation. This primary meaning may be considered a centre of radiation of other meanings. The Soviet linguist Mr Budagov suggests the following scheme for expressing polysemy: the front part expression outward the front part of the head of countenance appearance of the building (*to make faces*). The word *eye* originally meant the "organ of sight". From this semantic root there appeared such derivative meanings as "the power of seeing", "sight", "anything resembling an eye", like the "hole of a needle", "the loop of a hook", etc.

This is one direction in which the meaning of a word can be changed, and this may be called the *extension of meaning.* The extension of meanings includes the change both from concrete to abstract and from specific to general. The reasons for this extension of meaning can be different. They are often due to contiguity, to resemblance in form, position, colour and to the similarity of function. Sometimes the extension of meaning can be explained by extralinguistic factors or through the borrowing of words.

When considering words with the meaning "person" in the IE languages, it is noteworthy that a single protolinguistic etymon cannot be established here. Rather, it should be said that in different language groups this most important concept is expressed using different connotations, and therefore it should be described through the prism of such connotations. Mr Krasukhin proposes three explanations of these.

1. The first connotations are "Earth", "earthman", cf. Lat. *homo*; "mortal", cf. Lat. *morior*; "thought", "measure" in the German-Slavic model, cf. Lat. *mens* "reason", Lith. mintis "thought".

2. The second element of the name *man* is related to the age (development of the meaning "eternity", "strength", "youth", "child"). This ancient connection finds unexpected support in Russian poetry where the century and man reveal a close semantic connection.

3. There is another feature of the IE *man* that does not appear, however, directly. It can only be detected by comparing it with another name that denotes the opposite entity. The Slavic word is an ancient composite, comparable, in particular, with Lat. *hospes, host, hospitable* (<*hosti-pet-s), literally "host", "lord of guests".

Another example concerns the concept "time".

1. **Time as a space** is a rather complex system of notations, it includes several subsystems.

2. **Time as a measure** includes, first of all, the Lith. *metas* “time”, “age”. This token is based on the root **met -, *meh* – “measure”.

3. **Time as an integral part of space**, so to speak, the content of borders. Here, first of all, it is necessary to note Lith. *laikas* “time” associated with *laikyti* “keep”. This verb is a causative to the primary *likti* “to leave”. In Greek, this root also forms a temporal name: *λοιπούν* “future”.

4. **Time as movement**. This group includes the main Russian names of time: time is an ancient nomen actionis from the root *ert- “to move”, “turn”. The Slavic name finds a direct parallel in the Skr. *vartman* “running fate”. Thus, the etymology of the word time captures the idea of cyclical movement. The same root applies to other parts of speech: names like Lith. *pirmas*, Lat. *primus*. The etymology of the name *pora* in Russian embodies the idea of linear motion. The same concerns the name *vremya* which means linear time in the Russian language picture of the world, and *pora* means cyclical time. In reality, *vremya* and *pora* relate to each other as a broader and narrower concept. *Vremya* is the time of the onset of any state/event (the time of hopes and tender sadness), the time of the realization of a phenomenon, human abilities, natural processes. Therefore, *vremya* can come and go, run and flow. *Vremya*, unlike *pora*, is never personified; it is also not used in the plural.

The connection between time and cyclical time was obviously suggested to the researcher by the fact that this name often refers to natural repetitive processes. but, in Krasukhin's opinion, *vremya* and *pora* in the modern Russian language are not connected at all with the concept of cyclic and linear time.

§8. Controversy between Logic and Grammar

We noted many times that logic is indifferent to thought paradoxes. But some linguists state that logic is the science of correct thinking, and it considers only what is right. Logic, by its very essence, is the science of certain universal properties of thought, whereas knowledge must take into account individual deviations in the structure of thought and in the semantic structure of languages. Languages differ from each other not in their sound form, as they think, but in the whole structure of thought expressed in them, and in all their influence on the subsequent development of peoples. Individual differences in languages cannot be understood by logical grammar, because the logical categories imposed by it on the language have no national differences.

According to Russian linguist Mr Potebnya, the difference between grammar and logic is also evident in the nomenclature of their categories. There are incomparably more grammatical categories than logical ones. The subordination of grammar to logic is always reflected in the confusion and identification of such phenomena of language, which will turn out to be different if we start observing with one preconceived idea that what is *a priori* in linguistics is an empirical science. Finally, a word is not a concept, and a sentence is not a judgment. Logical concepts,

which are a prerequisite for logical judgment and inference, arise, according to this understanding, only at a certain, relatively high stage of development of language and thinking and therefore cannot be considered as correlates of a word that necessarily existed before the emergence of concepts and is not necessarily associated with the concept in the modern language. Thus, a grammatical sentence is non-identical and non-parallel to a logical proposition. Although logic uses the grammatical terms “subject” and “predicate” in relation to the members of the judgment, nevertheless this similarity is purely external. The meanings of these names are different in grammar and logic. For logic, only the compatibility or incongruity of two concepts is essential in a judgment, and which of them will be called a subject and a predicate should be indifferent, because in the formal sense of the word, it is not necessary to use the term “subject” or “predicate”. Logically, regardless of the mode of occurrence and verbal expression, it is all the same whether we say “horse is an animal”, “horse is not a dog” or “animal” includes “horse” (among animals there is a horse), “dog is not a horse” etc.

Categories of an object and its attribute are not necessary for logic, for which both are just concepts, collections of attributes. but it is probable to deduce the other members of the sentence from the logical judgment: definition, circumstance, supplement. Mr Potebnya argued that formal logic and linguistics have very few points of contact and that, in essence, there is no reason to accept a far-reaching logical-grammatical parallelism. Nevertheless, the development not only of the theory of language, but also of logic and the theory of knowledge has led in our days to a convergence of positions of these sciences in a number of points.

Of course, the problem of the mental basis of language is not limited to the question of the relationship between grammar and logic. The theory of linguistics, especially in such areas as semasiology and syntax, has created a number of prerequisites for more adequate coverage of the problem of language and thinking and clarification of the thinking foundations of the language system. The current state of science opens up the possibility of a closer interaction. Some of Potebnya's ideas need to be substantially refined in the light of these data. This concerns, first of all, the problem of the relation of word and concept, judgment and sentence. The statement that the word differs in all its content from the concept and cannot be its equivalent or expression simply because it precedes the concept in the course of the development of thought sounds too categorical and, in any case, should be softened. Of course, the content of a word – its meaning, or in the case of polysemy, each of its meanings – cannot be directly identified with the concept.

Reducing lexical meanings to concepts involves a more complex procedure, since, as Potebnya correctly noted, languages differ from each other not only in their sound side, but also in their semantic structure. Differences in the semantic structure are reflected in a number of relationships, of which the following should be mentioned first. These are differences in the relationship between simple and complex expressions. What is expressed in one language by a special word, in another language can be expressed descriptively, by a combination of several words.

Logically, this difference is insignificant, and modern logic calls both special designations and paraphrases. but for linguistics, this difference is extremely significant. Thus, in the semantic field “day - night - day” in a number of languages, such as German or French, there is no special word for day-night. Native speakers of such a language use either the descriptive expressions 24 hours or day and night to denote this concept, or use the word “day” to denote not only the light part of the day, but also the day as a whole (He was on a business trip for 20 days).

This phenomenon is explained by the fact that not all concepts forming a “semantic microfield” need a special lexical designation; logical relations between such concepts allow naming only some reference elements, leaving other elements for descriptive designation. In cases where a certain set consists of two complementary subsets, only subsets can get independent designations, but as for the set itself, it can be expressed descriptively (cf. brothers and sisters).

The ways of notation vary greatly in polar semantic fields, where set concepts represent a continuous scale of imperceptible gradual transitions from one extreme point to another. The choice of “reference points” for names in these cases varies significantly by language. Deviations in the content of words from concepts are also caused by the phenomena of synonymy and polysemy (homonymy) in the language.

The system of concepts of native speakers of different languages is basically more or less the same, and if speakers often experience significant difficulties when moving from one language to another, it is not because their “worldviews” are radically different, but because the semantic systems of their languages and the connections that go from concepts to concepts are different. This requires a serious caveat. Two differently structured languages rely on a similar system of elementary concepts only if they have the same level of development. You can not have a special word for the meaning of “day” in the language, but still master this concept using descriptive expressions for it. but it is another matter if native speakers of a particular language (or children under a certain age) do not have the concept of measurement and there are no measures of time. At this level of development, the concept of “day” in the sense of “24 hours” is also impossible. If the language does not have an elementary account of time, and there is no concept of “week”, “month”, etc., then the words “day” and “night” have very poor content in such a language. The system of elementary concepts develops along with the accumulation of specific knowledge.

The process of accumulation of concrete knowledge is crucial, which determines both the updating and restructuring of the system of elementary concepts and related forms of language. Examples of this kind lead us to the conclusion that the system of elementary concepts is historically variable and goes through a number of stages not only of quantitative multiplication, but also of qualitative “deepening” of the concept.

§9. The Concept of Concept

The idea that philosophy is a criticism of language can be traced back to Parmenides and Plato. Since that time language structure is not directly recognizable in its logic; therefore a deeper, hidden logical structure must be distinguished from the "surface form" of the grammar. Languages in their special form should be thus understood in a strictly scientific manner. Languages mean not only different "sounds" but also different "worldviews".

In transcendental logic one has to consider to what extent one can think that the (general) form of (individual) propositions says something about their cognitive function. Formal logic deals (as predicate logic) with possible forms of sentences through modifications and modality. Transcendental logic has no other object than this formality, because it wants to be transcendental and not deal with particular propositions.

Logic is also constitutive for the meaning of propositions in the objective sense. "Meaning" according to Mr Kant is the possibility of relating to an object, i.e. the objective validity. What (individual) sentences at all as a form for clarity belong to, should be constitutive for the possible reference to objects, insofar as they are objects at all. The view of an "object in general" is regarded as determined in relation to one of the logical functions for judgments. From Kant's considerations it follows that language cannot be transcendental, apart from a certain formal aspect of its propositions in general, to which it had to be reduced. Even Wittgenstein does not claim this directly from the language, but from the logic of the language.

Linguistics constructs the concept of language (langue) from the sentences. The symbol *S* for "sentence" is at the top of generative grammar. Since logic and epistemology also start from the sentence, it is philosophically instructive which special language concept deals with the presupposition of the concept of the isolated sentence. In formal logic, a proposition *p* is presupposed as a structure which means that it is either true or wrong, and epistemology asks for a possible assignment of a sentence *p* to a fact *x*, where *x* is considered a fact if there is a sentence *p* in a language *S* whose truth conditions are satisfied by *x*.

"Language", when it becomes thematic as an object, belongs to the gnoseologically problematic "objects" which are only present in "their" parts, but never as a whole. The sentence seems to be the empirical basis in which the idea of a "language" can be exemplified. The question after the truth of the individual sentence is lost in the imagination of a context of a specific form of use of language that cannot become an object in itself and therefore appears as meaningless in its transcendental-logical form. but the fact that the usage form of combining signs to form the basis of the comparison remains further provided.

Concepts are mental formations that necessarily rely on words, but are not directly reduced to a register of the meanings of individual words (simple names). They represent a slightly higher level of abstraction than the values of names, since not all elements of a semantic field are subject to special words, and consciousness

can easily accept the fact that only some (reference) elements of semantic fields are subject to unambiguous (isomorphic) definition.

As for the others, they can be expressed either descriptively or concurrently with the same reference words. Concepts are based on understanding certain relationships between objects, on identifying some elementary features of the object that are necessary for its identification and for the correct use of words, and not on an isomorphic relationship with individual names. In a language, therefore, concepts correspond not only to special words, but also to descriptive expressions. but what are concepts from the point of view of their internal state. What is the logical structure of these specific formations, which represent the mental catalogue of all the concrete structures stored in the mind.

Logic has long distinguished in concepts such aspects as the scope of the concept and its content. In modern logic, these moments are kept in the form of the concepts of “extensional” and “intensional”, sometimes the terms “meaning” and “signification” are used in this sense. The concepts of extensional and intensional do not refer to specific logical concepts related to logical inference operations, but to the concept of any level and any kind of thinking and, thus, are subject to definition in the broadest possible way.

By “volume” or “extensional” of a concept, we mean the ability of a given concept and its corresponding name (simple and complex) to denote elements of a certain set of objects. Real objects have an infinite number of attributes and depending on their particular attributes and combinations of attributes can be included into various sets. An intensive is a feature, it is a set of features that serve as the basis for identifying a given set and its associated concept. Unlike extensional, intensional does not represent an object, but characterizes it.

Very often a concept is defined as a special form of thought along with such a form as a judgment or proposition. The specific difference between a concept and a statement of logic, as a rule, is seen in the fact that the concept itself is not a statement and does not have a truth function. This means that the relation of the concept to the subject is different from the relation of the utterance to the subject. It is advisable to draw the same distinction that Mr Saussure drew in relation to speech phenomena, highlighting the concepts of “language” and “speech”.

The content of the concept, its intensional, is something vague and elusive for the nominalist. The most that he finds in the term is its relation to a specific object, to the “stimulus object” at the moment of speech. but where does this ability of the term to relate to an “object-stimulus” come from as a designation and as a characteristic. Apparently, because in the course of the development of a given society, each term has a certain meaning, which must necessarily accompany this word at the moment of its use and which must necessarily manifest itself in such use. but what is the use of the word. This is either a naming convention, i.e. a direct application of a name to a (present) object, or an utterance, i.e. a combination of words in a complex semantic whole, endowed with some actual meaning (i.e., a combination of words).

The internal properties of a name must therefore manifest themselves in the

relation of the name to its speech referent, as well as in the relations between words in a sentence, one word to another. Even consideration of the simplest sentence clearly shows how the process of identifying the semantic content of a word is carried out. In the sentence Horse runs, two dissimilar terms, one of which expresses the idea of a horse, and the other – the idea of running, play different roles. The first term plays an active role as a designation of a predicate, a carrier of certain features. This is the element of the statement to be explicated. The second word functions as a means of explication and performs the function of characterization.

The designation and characteristic are correlative and interdependent, they are inseparable and imply each other, but at the same time they are polar opposites. Actualization of the meaning-concept is achieved in two ways, namely: internal actualization of the meaning-concept itself and its external actualization by updating another word and attaching the latter to the former.

Let's consider each of these types of actualization separately. Internal actualization of designations can be carried out in two ways: implicit-situational and explicit-expressed actualization. Implicit-situational actualization of the designation seems to ordinary consciousness to be a very simple act of naming an object: an airplane has appeared in my field of vision, and I say to the people around me: “A plane!” At first glance, there is nothing special in the act of utterance: this is a completely natural application of the name to what is also meant by this name. but this act seems natural to us only because we have mastered it since childhood and because, being an elementary act of speech thinking, it is repeated in every act of thinking and speech and does not require any noticeable effort from us. but the fact that the child gradually learns to speak, including the act of naming, shows that in reality this act is the least simple and self-evident. The act of situational naming involves, first of all, the selection in the field of perception of a particular object of interest to speakers. It assumes, in other words, the distribution of the surrounding environment to the object of interest and surrounding objects, which in this case recede into the background and become neutral for the selected object and an indifferent background. It is necessary, further, that the speaker should be surrounded by other people who can hear me and for whom this subject would also have an attractive force and be of interest in some way. We also need to have at our disposal a name that we can use to name a given item, or a series of simple names.

Being a manifestation of the systemic organization of the language, the context ensures the reliability of the functioning of the word in the conditions of interference, inevitable in the process of communication. The “noise” that the context must overcome is created by the ambiguity of words (which means that the interference that occurs in the process of communication is inherent in the very nature of words). Thus, the context acts, on the one hand, as a clarifying, and on the other hand, as a restorative, compensating apparatus, which means that it performs three functions: clarifying – identifying and updating – and restorative.

Similar distribution theory and practice of contextual research is legitimate, since each sign is both synonymous and ambiguous, while the context eliminates the

ambiguity of this sign and at the same time sets the boundaries of the series of which it is a member. Depending on whether the given word is known or not to the reader, there is a switch from the restorative to the clarifying function and vice versa.

§10. WordNets

For the component analysis, the concept must be correlated with a hypernym and with all equinomies in the subject area outlined by this hypernym. Applying this analysis of this kind to concepts expressed in signs of any language, i.e., to meanings (see below), we would get as a result a certain list of limiting (simple, indecomposable, atomic) semes, e.g. *corn, board, green.*

corn
1) wheat
2) bread
3) grain
……..

board
1) shelf
2) dashboard
3) floor
4) scene
5) board (ship)
6) binding cover
7) table
8) council
……..

green
1) green colour
2) kept the original quality
3) young
4) unripe, immature
5) inexperienced
6) simple-hearted, gullible
……..



It is clear that such graphs, reflecting only the relationship of meanings by content, are a very simplified semantic word structures. In fact, the semantic space of a polysemantic word and its semantic structure are organized in a much more complex way. It found reflexion in WordNet for English vocabulary. Multilinguality can be achieved by adding an equivalence relation for each synset in a language to the synset in WordNet. Synsets linked to the same WordNet synset are supposed to be

equivalent or dose in meaning and can then be compared.

Example of WordNet “learn”



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